































































































Abstract:	 Rapid	 and	 comprehensive	 social	 change	 is	 required	 to	 mitigate	 pressing	







the	 underlying	 assumption	 of	 homogenous	 preferences.	 Relaxing	 this	 assumption,	 we	
devise	 a	 threshold	 model	 of	 tipping	 pro-environmental	 norm	 diffusion.	 The	 model	
suggests	that	depending	on	the	distribution	of	social	preferences	in	a	population,	and	the	
individual	cost	of	adopting	a	given	pro-environmental	behaviour,	the	same	intervention	
















These	 interventions	 typically	 rely	 on	 human	 decision	 heuristics	 or	 social	 influence	
(Byerly	et	al.,	2018;	Cinner,	2018).	For	example,	default	nudging	exploits	the	heuristic	of	
simply	going	with	the	default	option	instead	of	pondering	which	option	is	best	(Thaler	
and	 Sunstein,	 2008).	 As	 an	 application,	 providers	 have	 set	 sustainably	 produced	
electricity	 instead	of	 conventionally	produced	electricity	as	a	default	 (Liebe,	Gewinner	
and	Diekmann,	2021).	Interventions	based	on	social	influence	typically	stress	behaviours	
that	are	socially	expected	or	chosen	by	a	majority.	For	example,	to	encourage	the	re-usage	
of	 towels	 in	 hotels,	 guests	 have	 been	made	 aware	 that	 a	majority	 is	 engaging	 in	 this	
behaviour	(Goldstein,	Cialdini	and	Griskevicius,	2008).	
A	 number	 of	 quantitative	 meta-analyses	 show	 that	 sometimes	 these	 kinds	 of	
interventions	can	have	a	 tremendous	 impact.	Yet,	 the	typical	effect	size	 is	moderate	at	
best	 (Osbaldiston	 and	 Schott,	2012;	 Abrahamse	 and	 Steg,	 2013;	 Lokhorst	 et	 al.,	 2013;	








will	 in	 turn	point	 toward	specific	strategies	 for	 improvement.	Our	starting	point	 is	 the	
observation	 that	 most	 interventions	 target	 individuals	 to	 trigger	 behaviour	 change	
(Bicchieri	 and	 Dimant,	 2019).	 Models	 of	 cultural	 evolution	 suggest	 targeting	 groups	
instead	because	a	strategy	of	this	kind	can	reinforce	the	impact	of	a	given	intervention	
(Waring	et	al.,	2015;	Waring,	Goff	and	Smaldino,	2017;	Brooks	et	al.,	2018).		
Pioneering	 theoretical	 contributions	have	provided	 fascinating	 insights	 into	 the	
mechanisms	 that	 translate	 behaviour	 change	of	 a	 few	 into	 large-scale	 societal	 change.	
These	contributions	centre	on	the	notion	of	‘social	tipping’.	Tipping	is	the	phenomenon	
that	 a	 small	 subgroup	 of	 a	 population,	 adopting	 a	 new	 behaviour,	 can	 trigger	 a	 self-




they	 believe	 that	 a	 sufficient	 number	 of	 others	 is	 also	 conforming	 to	 this	 pattern	
(Bicchieri,	2005).	
Recent	research	empirically	corroborates	the	power	of	tipping.	Subgroups	of	25-
35	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 population	 can	 establish	 a	 new	 behaviour	 as	 a	 social	 norm	 in	 the	
laboratory	 (Centola	 et	 al.,	 2018;	 Andreoni,	 Nikiforakis	 and	 Siegenthaler,	 2021).	
Concerning	 social	 norms	 regulating	 behaviours	 with	 environmental	 impact	 (in	 the	












Platteau	 and	 Auriol,	 2018).	 The	 idea	 of	 recruiting	 the	 endogenous	 dynamics	 of	 norm	
diffusion	with	an	exogenous	intervention,	delimited	in	size	and	time,	is	tempting	and	has	
recently	been	put	forward	as	a	tool	for	environmental	policy	(Westley	et	al.,	2011;	Nyborg,	
2018,	2020;	Otto	et	al.,	 2020).	Yet	 there	 is	no	 foolproof	way	of	 activating	 tipping,	 and	
attempts	to	do	so	have	produced	a	variety	of	results	(Bicchieri,	2017;	Efferson,	Vogt	and	
Fehr,	2020).	
Tipping	 dynamics	 have	 so	 far	 been	 described	 with	 coordination	 game	 models	
(Schelling,	1973;	Bicchieri,	2005;	Nyborg,	2020).	We	first	outline	how	these	models	apply	
to	 large-scale	 pro-environmental	 behaviour	 change.	 Then,	we	 show	 that	 a	 simplifying	
assumption	 of	 these	 models,	 the	 assumption	 of	 homogenous	 preferences,	 may	 evoke	
overly	optimistic	expectations	about	 the	potential	of	 tipping.	More	to	the	point,	recent	









































2016;	 Castilla-Rho	 et	 al.,	 2017;	 Sigdel,	 Anand	 and	 Bauch,	 2017).	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	






social	 preference,	 conditional	 cooperation,	 is	 a	 major	 driver	 of	 cooperation	 in	
experimental	 public	 goods	 games	 (Henrich	 et	 al.,	 2001;	 Fehr	 and	 Fischbacher,	 2003;	
Gintis	et	al.,	2003).	While	self-interested	individuals	free-ride	in	these	games,	conditional	
cooperators	 are	 willing	 to	 cooperate	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 others	 are	 cooperating,	 too	
(Fischbacher,	Gächter	and	Fehr,	2001;	Fehr	and	Gächter,	2002;	Biel	and	Thøgersen,	2007;	




















Schmidt	 preferences,	 playing	 a	 nominal	 social	 dilemma	 game	 with	 two	 options,	
cooperation	and	defection	(Figure	A1c	in	the	Appendix).	Importantly,	for	an	actor	with	
associated	preferences,	not	only	the	nominal	payoffs	are	relevant.	Also	disadvantageous	




More	 technically,	 the	 greater	 a	 conditionally	 cooperative	 focal’s	 expected	
probability,	 𝑞,	 that	 other	 is	 taking	 the	 train,	 the	 greater	 her	 expected	 utility	 from	
cooperation,	𝐸(𝐶).	 Equating	𝐸(𝐶)	 with	 her	 expected	 utility	 of	 defection,	𝐸(𝐷),	 yields	
focal’s	indifference	point,	𝑞∗.	At	this	point,	she	is	indifferent	between	𝐶	and	𝐷	(Figure	A1d	
in	the	Appendix).	After	crossing	𝑞∗,	focal	prefers	𝐶	over	𝐷	which	means,	the	nominal	social	







Instead,	 there	are	 two	equilibria:	mutual	 cooperation	and	mutual	defection.	When	 the	
game	is	played	repeatedly	in	a	group	of	conditional	cooperators,	the	population	dynamics	










𝑞- < 𝑞∗,	 they	 opt	 for	 flights	 and	 the	 proportion	 of	 train	 users	 decreases	 over	 time,	
converging	towards	zero.	When	𝑞- > 𝑞∗,	they	opt	for	train	travel,	and	the	proportion	of	
train	users	increases,	converging	towards	the	cooperative	equilibrium.	
Let	 us	 now	 assume	 a	 policymaker	 intending	 to	 push	 the	 population	 dynamics	
towards	the	cooperative	equilibrium	to	curb	climate	gas	emissions.	Most	policymakers	
have	limited	resources,	and	they	are	therefore	unable	to	target	the	entire	population	with	








has	 two	hypothetical	 effects.	 A	 direct	 effect,	 enhancing	 climate-friendly	 choices	 in	 the	
target.	And	an	indirect	effect	in	the	untreated	segment	of	the	population,	emulating	the	
behaviour	of	the	treated.	We	call	this	indirect	effect	‘social	tipping’,	or	simply	‘tipping’.	In	
our	 example,	 the	 policymaker	 could	 deliberately	 try	 to	 create	 tipping	 by	 pushing	 the	
proportion	of	train	users	in	the	population	across	the	critical	value,	𝑞∗,	with	a	delimited	
intervention.		
When	 the	 proportion	 of	 train	users,	𝑞- ,	 does	 not	 undercut	𝑞∗	 too	 strongly,	 pre-
intervention,	 the	policymaker	might	well	succeed.	As	 soon	as	𝑞∗	 	 is	 crossed,	more	and	




for	 a	 policymaker	 to	 succeed,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 know	 𝑞∗.	 The	 higher	𝑞∗,	 the	 harder	 the	
cooperative	equilibrium	is	to	reach.		
It	can	be	shown	that	𝑞∗	depends	on	two	parameters	–	the	incentive	structure	of	the	













This	model	 implication	 fits	well	 the	 following	 results	 of	 recent	 meta-analyses:	
changing	high-impact	behaviours,	such	as	avoiding	flights	or	animal	products	(Wynes	and	
Nicholas,	 2017;	 Schiermeier,	 2019),	 seems	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 with	 behaviour	
interventions,	compared	to	behaviours	with	relatively	low	impact	(Bergquist,	Nilsson	and	
Schultz,	 2019;	 Nisa	 et	 al.,	 2019,	 see	 Figure	 1).	 As	 a	 likely	 explanation,	 changing	 high-
impact	behaviours	typically	requires	individually	costly	lifestyle	changes.	Put	differently,	
for	 these	behaviours,	 the	tension	between	private	and	public	benefit	 in	 the	underlying	
environmental	dilemma	is	quite	strong.	
Granted,	Figure	1	provides	only	suggestive	evidence	for	the	claim	that	tension	is	a	
key	 factor	 of	 intervention	 effectiveness.	 One	 potential	 confounder	 is	 the	 type	 of	
intervention	 strategy.	 Specific	 research	paradigms,	 favouring	 strategies	 that	vary	with	
respect	to	their	strength	or	impact,	tend	to	address	specific	behaviours	(Nisa	et	al.,	2019),	
which	could	at	least	partly	explain	the	association	between	tension	and	effectiveness.		








are	 much	 less	 predictive	 of	 costly	 pro-environmental	 behaviours	 (Diekmann	 and	







Concerning	 social	 preferences,	 one	 can	 show	 that	 for	 a	 given	 environmental	
dilemma,	 in	 a	 homogenous	 population	 with	 identical	 Fehr-Schmidt	 preferences,	 the	
following	 holds.	 The	 stronger	 advantageous	 inequity	 aversion	 𝛽	 relative	 to	
disadvantageous	inequity	aversion	𝛼	and	self-interest,	 the	 lower	the	perceived	tension	
between	public	and	private	 interest,	and	therefore,	 the	 lower	𝑞∗.	This	 implies	 that	 two	
























a	 number	 of	 complexities,	 for	 example,	 different	 network	 structures	 or	 intervention	
strategies.		
In	 what	 follows,	 based	 on	 a	 threshold	 model,	 we	 discuss	 how	 preference	
heterogeneity	and	the	tension	inherent	to	a	specific	environmental	dilemma	control	the	







proportion	 of	 cooperators	 at	 time	 𝑡.	 When	 each	 individual	 in	 a	 population	 regularly	
evaluates	the	cooperative	behaviour	of	others	and	updates	her	beliefs	accordingly,	then	
cooperation	 changes	 over	 time	 according	 to	 𝑞-45	 = 𝐹(𝑞-).	 This	 is	 a	 well-discussed	
property	 of	 the	 threshold	 model	 (Granovetter,	 1978;	 Schelling,	 1978).	 As	 a	 central	







Under	 right-skewed	 threshold	 distributions,	 the	 potential	 for	 tipping	 is	
considerable.	In	this	scenario,	a	majority	has	low	thresholds.	Some	may	even	be	willing	to	




skewed	 threshold	 distribution,	 and	 Figure	 2d	 shows	 the	 corresponding	 cumulative	
distribution.	Points	at	which	𝐹	 intersects	the	diagonal	from	above	are	stable	equilibria,	
whereas	points	at	which	F	intersects	from	below	are	unstable	equilibria.	Here,	F	intersects	










Under	 left-skewed	distributions,	 the	potential	for	 tipping	 is	 the	smallest.	 In	 this	
scenario,	a	majority	has	high	thresholds,	some	may	even	defect	unconditionally,	and	only	
a	small	minority	of	very	prosocial	individuals	has	low	thresholds.	An	example	is	avoiding	




Symmetrical	 distributions	 are	 an	 intermediate	 case.	 They	 can	 result	 from	










In	 brief,	 any	 intervention	 is	most	 likely	 to	 activate	 tipping	 under	 right-skewed	

































has	 frequently	 been	 used	 to	 promote	 pro-environmental	 behaviour,	 under	 the	 label	
‘descriptive	 norms	 intervention’	 (e.g.	 Schultz	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Goldstein,	 Cialdini	 and	
Griskevicius,	 2008).	 The	 key	 idea	 is	 feeding	 back	 the	 current	 cooperation	 level,	 called	
descriptive	information,	to	the	population,	which	then	leads	people	to	adapt	false	beliefs.	
The	behavioural	consequence	of	the	intervention,	which	makes	the	distribution	of	choices	









promoted	 energy	 saving	 among	 households	 with	 above-average	 consumption,	 but	
increased	consumption	among	households	below	 the	average	 (Schultz	et	al.,	 2007).	 In	
principle,	due	to	the	no-control	group	design	of	that	specific	study,	regression	to	the	mean	
could	explain	this	result.	That	 is,	 the	 ‘backlash’	among	households	with	below-average	
energy	 consumption	 might	 have	 occurred	 even	 in	 absence	 of	 the	 intervention	
(Verkooijen,	 Stok	 and	 Mollen,	 2015).	 Yet	 regression	 to	 the	 mean	 it	 is	 an	 unlikely	
explanation	 for	 the	 backlash	 observed	 in	many	 other	 studies.	 For	 example,	 providing	
feedback	about	the	share	of	coffee	sold	in	reusable	mugs	instead	of	one-way	paper	cups	
increased	the	share	of	coffee	bought	in	mugs	at	one	cafeteria,	with	a	relatively	high	initial	
level	 of	mug	 usage,	 compared	 to	 a	 control	 group.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 intervention	
discouraged	mug	 usage	 at	 another	 cafeteria,	 with	 a	 relatively	 low	 initial	 level	 of	mug	
usage,	 compared	 to	 the	 same	 control	 group	 (Berger,	 2021).	 In	 fact,	 evidence	 from	
controlled	 laboratory	 experiments	 suggests	 that	 an	 individual’s	 beliefs	 about	 the	
prevalence	 of	 cooperation	 in	 a	 group	 are	 a	 strong	 determinant	 of	 that	 individual’s	
cooperativeness	 (Fischbacher,	 Gächter	 and	 Fehr,	 2001;	 Bicchieri	 and	 Xiao,	 2009;	
Ackermann	 and	Murphy,	 2019).	Based	 on	 this	 result,	 the	 threshold	model	 has	 a	 clear	
answer	to	the	question	of	when	beliefs-based	interventions	have	beneficial	outcomes,	and	
when	harmful	outcomes	are	more	likely.	
To	 illustrate	 this,	 picture	 a	 policymaker	 intending	 to	 tip	 the	 diffusion	 of	 a	 pro-








fact,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 clear	 information	 about	 the	 prevalence	 of	 a	 specific	 pro-
environmental	 behaviour,	 people	 tend	 to	 underestimate	 the	 engagement	 of	 others,	
relative	 to	 their	 own	 engagement	 –	 a	 bias	 that	 dampens	 their	 willingness	 to	 act	
environmentally	friendly	(Pieters	et	al.,	1998;	Bergquist,	2020;	Leviston	and	Uren,	2020).	
In	the	following	discussion,	we	therefore	explicitly	assume	beliefs	that	are	distorted	and	
























or	 undershoot	 their	 beliefs	 to	 some	degree,	which	 is,	 however,	 inconsequential.	What	
matters	is	that	these	agents	presume	cooperation	to	match	or	exceed	their	thresholds	and	
that	this	is	actually	the	case.	Cooperators	holding	beliefs	that	are	accurate	in	this	sense	
cooperate	before	and	after	 the	 first	 round	of	 feedback.	 Second,	 cooperators	with	 false	
beliefs,	in	the	sense	that	they	assume	cooperation	to	match	or	exceed	their	thresholds,	
while	cooperation,	in	fact,	undershoots	their	thresholds	(𝑥>	in	region	𝐵	of	Figure	3a).	They	
cooperate	 before	 the	 intervention,	 but,	 disappointed	 from	 the	 first	 feedback,	 stop	
cooperating	 in	 response.	 Third,	 defectors	 holding	 the	 false	 belief	 of	 cooperation	
















𝑞5 	= 	 𝑞B 	−	𝑥> 	+	𝑥@.	 The	 immediate	 effect	 of	 ensuring	 correct	 beliefs	 can	 thus	 be	






the	 possibility	 of	 distorted	 beliefs	 by	 making	 the	 current	 rate	 of	 cooperation	 public	






distribution	 is	 right-skewed,	 with	 beliefs	 and	 thresholds	 uncorrelated.	 In	 this	 case,	
cooperators	 with	 accurate	 beliefs	 (𝑥5),	 and	 defectors	with	 false	 beliefs	 (𝑥@),	 together	
outnumber	cooperators	with	false	beliefs	(𝑥>),	plus	defectors	with	accurate	beliefs	(𝑥A).	






In	 Scenarios	 2,	 the	 threshold	 distribution	 is	 symmetrical,	 with	 thresholds	 and	
beliefs	correlated	positively	(Figure	3,	d-f).	Here,	the	outcome	depends	on	the	relative	size	
of	 those	 with	 thresholds	 undershooting	 cooperation,	 pre-intervention	 (𝑥5 + 𝑥@),	
compared	 to	 those	with	 thresholds	exceeding	 cooperation,	pre-intervention	 (𝑥> +	𝑥A).	
More	specifically,	when	𝑥5 + 𝑥@ < 𝑥> +	𝑥A,	pre-intervention,	cooperation	cannot	exceed	
𝑥5 + 𝑥@	in	 the	 long	 term.	 In	 contrast,	 when	 𝑥5 + 𝑥@ > 𝑥> +	𝑥A,	 pre-intervention,	
cooperation	 can	 increase,	 with	 the	 final	 result	 depending	 on	 the	 exact	 threshold	
distribution.		
Scenario	 3	 also	 assumes	 a	 symmetrical	 distribution,	 but	 a	 negative	 correlation	
between	thresholds	and	beliefs	(Figure	3,	g-i).	In	this	case,	individuals	that	cooperate	or	

















In	 short,	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 beliefs-based	 intervention	 depends	 on	 the	 joint	
distribution	 of	 thresholds	 and	 beliefs.	 The	 intervention	 eliminates	 the	 possibility	 of	
distorted	 beliefs.	 Once	 this	 happens,	 the	 preference	 heterogeneity	 represented	 by	 the	
distribution	of	thresholds	is	the	mechanism	driving	the	evolution	of	cooperation.	Under	
right-skewed	 threshold	 distributions,	 this	 intervention	 strategy	 bears	 considerable	
potential,	while	it	tends	to	provoke	backlash	under	left-skewed	threshold	distributions.	
Under	 symmetric	 distributions,	 the	 outcome	 strongly	 depends	 on	 the	 structure	 of	

















The	second	strategy	 is	 treating	 the	 thresholds	with	monetary	 incentives,	 either	
with	a	subsidy,	like	a	train	voucher,	or	a	tax,	like	a	carbon	tax	on	air	travel.	Both	options	
enhance	 the	 benefit	 of	 cooperation	 relative	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 defection,	 decreasing	 the	
thresholds.	 A	 possible	 drawback	 of	 monetary	 incentives	 is	 that	 the	 thresholds	 might	
return	 to	 their	 pre-intervention	 levels,	 once	 the	 incentives	 are	 removed.	 Even	worse,	







In	 contrast,	preference-based	 interventions,	 the	 third	strategy,	 target	 individual	
preferences	to	decrease	the	thresholds.	One	variant	is	increasing	the	psychological	value	
of	cooperation.	For	example,	the	target	individuals	could	learn	about	the	environmental	
advantage	 of	 train	 travel	 compared	 to	 air	 travel.	 Another	 variant	 would	 promote	
advantageous	inequity	aversion.	
It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 combination	 of	 preference-based	 intervention	 and	
financial	incentives	has	proven	astonishingly	effective	in	promoting	pro-environmental	












population.	 In	 this	case,	 treating	only	a	delimited	sample	of	 the	population,	 to	activate	
diffusion	 of	 the	 target	 behaviour	 in	 the	 untreated	 segment	 of	 the	 population	 is	 an	
appealing	approach.	Yet	policymakers	should	be	aware	that	the	shape	of	the	threshold	
distributions	in	the	population	and	the	target	largely	control	the	potential	for	tipping.		
More	 specifically,	 four	parameters	 control	 that	potential.	 First,	 the	 shape	of	 the	
threshold	distribution	in	the	population	and	the	target,	namely,	right-skewed,	symmetric,	
or	left-skewed.	For	the	following	discussion,	we	assume	a	randomly	selected	target,	and	
consequently	 the	 threshold	distribution	 in	 the	 target	 approximates	 the	 corresponding	
distribution	 in	 the	 population.	 Second,	 intervention	 effectiveness,	 𝑑.	 We	 assume	 the	
intervention	to	decrease	the	thresholds	in	the	target	deterministically,	by	a	value	of	𝑑.	An	
individual	 starts	 cooperating,	 when	 her	 post-intervention	 threshold,	 𝑞1∗
G = 𝑞1∗ − 𝑑,	 is	
smaller	than,	or	equal	to,	the	cooperation	level	in	the	population,	pre-intervention,	𝑞B.	The	
stronger	𝑑,	the	larger	the	proportion	of	actors	in	the	target	switching	to	cooperation	in	













Concerning	 the	 direct	 effect,	 given	 an	 effective	 intervention,	 the	 share	 of	 those	
switching	to	cooperation	 in	response	to	the	 intervention	 is	 largest	under	right-skewed	
distributions,	where	low	thresholds	prevail,	followed	by	symmetric	distributions,	where	
intermediate	 values	 prevail,	 and,	 finally,	 left-skewed	distributions,	where	 large	 values	
prevail.	Put	differently,	after	the	intervention,	the	subsample	of	cooperative	individuals	
in	 the	 target	 is	 smaller	 under	 symmetric	 distributions	 than	 under	 right-skewed	














start-up	 group.	 And	 under	 left-skewed	 distributions,	 compared	 to	 symmetric	
distributions,	an	even	smaller	start-up	group	coincides	with	the	need	for	an	even	larger	
start-up	group.		






her	 sampling	 strategy	 could	 further	 boost	 her	 success,	 as	 Efferson	 et	 al.,	 (2020)	
demonstrate.	 Given	 the	 policymaker	 has	 a	 very	 effective	 intervention	 at	 hand,	 an	
















segment	 of	 the	 population,	 and,	 therefore,	 higher	 hurdles	 for	 tipping.	 The	 strategy	 of	
random	sampling,	selecting	 from	among	both,	 the	more	and	 the	 less	 cooperative,	may	
therefore	often	be	a	reasonable	compromise.		
In	 the	 light	of	 this	 finding,	 the	widespread	practice	of	using	 student	 samples,	 a	
subgroup	 typically	 more	 amenable	 to	 pro-environmental	 behaviour	 change	 than	 the	
population	average,	seems	questionable	(Nisa	et	al.,	2019).	Not	only	might	that	sampling	
strategy	 evoke	 an	 overly	 optimistic	 view	of	 the	 intervention	 under	 study.	 In	 practical	




clearly	 shows	 that	 results	 from	 so-called	 ‘WEIRD’	 samples,	 drawn	 from	 western,	



















The	 idea	 of	 recruiting	 the	 endogenous	 dynamics	 of	 norm	 diffusion	 with	 an	
exogenous	intervention,	delimited	in	size	and	time,	is	tempting.	Yet	tipping	interventions	




Nyborg,	 2020),	 may	 give	 rise	 to	 somewhat	 optimistic	 expectations	 regarding	 the	
potentials	 of	 tipping	 (Efferson,	 Vogt	 and	 Fehr,	 2020).	 More	 specifically,	 it	 is	 the	






vary	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 preferences,	 and	 this	 includes	 support	 for	 specific	
environmental	policies.		
Preference	heterogeneity	constrains	tipping.	This	does	not	mean	that	tipping	is	a	
blunt	 sword	 under	 preference	 heterogeneity.	 Yet	 to	 devise	 a	 successful	 tipping	
intervention,	 understanding	 the	 implications	 of	 heterogeneity	 is	 key.	 Our	 research	
cultivates	 this	 kind	 of	 understanding,	 discussing	 the	 question:	 How	 does	 preference	
heterogeneity	 impact	 the	potential	of	 tipping	 in	 the	 field	of	pro-environmental	policy?	
Applying	a	threshold	model	(Granovetter,	1978;	Schelling,	1978;	Macy,	1991)	to	the	issue	
of	pro-environmental	norm	diffusion,	we	discuss	structures	of	preference	heterogeneity	
more	 and	 less	 favourable	 for	 tipping,	 and	 suggest	 intervention	 strategies	 suitable	 for	
these	structures.			




benefit	 inherent	 to	 a	 dilemma	 (Bowles,	 2009;	 Goeschl	 et	 al.,	 2020).	 The	 adoption	 of	











private	 benefit,	 the	 lower	 the	 individual	 threshold	 (Bicchieri,	 2005;	 Bowles,	 2009;	
Centola,	2013).	
Tension	 and	 social	 preferences	 together	 shape	 a	 threshold	 distribution.	 Low	
tension	and	widespread	advantageous	inequity	aversion	imply	the	predominance	of	low	
thresholds,	 or,	 a	 threshold	 distribution	 that	 is	 skewed	 to	 the	 right.	 High	 tension	 and	










Concerning	 the	 direct	 effect,	 the	 more	 strongly	 right-skewed	 the	 threshold	
distribution	 in	the	target,	pre-intervention,	 the	 larger	the	share	of	 the	target	switching	








value.	 When,	 post-intervention,	 a	 target	 individual’s	 threshold	 undershoots	 the	 pre-
intervention	prevalence	of	the	target	behaviour	in	the	population,	this	individual	adopts	
the	target	behaviour.	Holding	the	prevalence	of	 the	target	behaviour	 in	 the	population	
constant,	interventions	of	identical	effect	size,	therefore,	induce	adoption	in	larger	shares	
of	 the	 target	 when	 low	 thresholds	 prevail	 (right-skewed	 distributions),	 compared	 to	
when	 intermediate	 thresholds	 prevail	 (symmetric	 distributions),	 and,	 even	 more	 so,	
compared	to	when	high	thresholds	prevail	(left-skewed	distributions).	




up	 group	needed	 to	 cross	 a	 tipping	 point	 is	 smaller,	 compared	 to	 a	 population	where	
roughly	 equal	 parts	 have	 low	 or	 high	 thresholds	 (symmetric	 distribution),	 or	 even	 a	
population,	 where	 high	 thresholds	 dominate	 (left-skewed	 distribution).	 Moreover,	 as	
discussed,	symmetric,	and	even	more	so,	left-skewed,	distributions,	constrain	the	effect	
of	 the	exogenous	 intervention	 in	the	target,	resulting	 in	a	smaller	cooperative	start-up	
group.	In	short,	the	larger	the	start-up	group	theoretically	needed	for	activating	tipping,	
the	smaller	the	actual	start-up	group,	resulting	from	the	exogenous	intervention.	
What	 are	 strategies	 for	 activating	 tipping?	 A	 policymaker	 can	 either	 treat	 the	






she	 could	 treat	 the	preferences	of	 the	 individuals	 involved.	One	example	 is	promoting	
advantageous	 inequity	 aversion,	 which	 would	 boost	 the	 psychological	 value	 of	
cooperation	in	the	respective	environmental	dilemma.	
Earlier	research	suggests	that	using	financial	incentives	could	crowd	out	intrinsic	
motivation	 (Frey	 and	 Oberholzer-Gee,	 1997;	 Reeson	 and	 Tisdell,	 2008;	 Rode,	 Gómez-
Baggethun	 and	 Krause,	 2015;	 Lapinski	 et	 al.,	 2017),	 which	 would	 speak	 in	 favour	 of	
treating	the	preferences.	More	current	research	finds	that	combining	financial	incentives	
with	 psychological	 interventions	 is	 not	 only	more	 effective	 than	 using	 any	 of	 the	 two	




prevalence	 of	 the	 target	 behaviour.	 Treating	 beliefs	 means	 simply	 feeding	 back	













beliefs-based	 interventions	 is	 driven	 by	 disappointment	 cooperators.	 Namely,	 by	
individuals	 that	 expected	 cooperation	 to	 exceed	 their	 thresholds,	 but	 learn	 that	 the	
opposite	is	the	case,	therefore	switching	back	from	cooperation	to	defection	in	response	
to	 the	 intervention.	 Under	 left-skewed	 distributions,	 high	 thresholds	 prevail	 and	
disappointment	is,	therefore,	more	likely	than	positive	surprise.	The	opposite	holds	under	
right-skewed	distributions.	The	positively	surprised	defectors,	learning	that	cooperation	
is	 exceeding	 rather	 than	 undershooting	 their	 thresholds,	 likely	 outnumber	 the	
disappointed	cooperators,	which	results	in	a	beneficial	net	outcome.	
Under	 symmetric	 distributions,	 the	 net	 effect	 of	 a	 beliefs-based	 intervention	
depends	on	the	correlation	between	thresholds	and	beliefs.	A	negative	correlation	implies	
a	 negligible	 effect.	 In	 this	 case,	 those	 with	 overly	 optimistic	 beliefs	 have	 also	 low	
thresholds.	They	stick	to	 the	target	behaviour,	post-intervention,	when	they	 learn	that	
cooperation	 is	 exceeding	 their	 thresholds	 only	 slightly,	 rather	 than	 substantially.	 And	
those	with	overly	pessimistic	beliefs	have	high	thresholds.	They	keep	defecting	when	they	




In	 contrast,	 a	 positive	 correlation	 bears	 a	 strong	 potential	 for	 tipping,	 provided,	 the	
following	holds	additionally.	Cooperators	with	accurate	beliefs,	and	defectors	with	false	






Therefore,	 it	 is	 encouraging	 that	 most	 people	 tend	 to	 underestimate	 other’s	 pro-




under	 left-skewed	 threshold	 distributions.	 Or	 under	 symmetric	 distributions,	 given	 a	







2012,	 2017;	 Rinscheid,	 Pianta	 and	Weber,	 2020).	 Cutting	 the	 link	 between	 the	 target	
behaviour	 and	 the	 social	 identities	 involved	 is	 then	 a	 precondition	 for	 a	 pro-
environmental	norm	to	spread	through	the	entire	population	(Doell	et	al.,	2021).	
To	 sum	 our	 findings,	 right-skewed	 distributions	 imply	 strong	 potentials	 for	
tipping.	In	this	case,	small	interventions,	targeting	beliefs,	preferences,	or	incentives,	can	
produce	quick	and	comprehensive	norm	diffusions.	The	opposite	holds	for	left-skewed	
distributions.	 Here,	 large	 interventions,	 preferably	 bundling	 different	 strategies,	 for	
















gather	 information	 about	 the	 joint	 distributions	 of	 thresholds	 and	 beliefs	 in	 the	
population,	 as	 about	 the	 population	 prevalence	 of	 the	 target	 behaviour,	 before	
implementing	an	intervention.	This	information	will	allow	her	to	gauge	the	potential	for	
tipping	 that	 is	 socially	beneficial,	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 a	backlash.	 She	 could	 then	 tailor	her	
intervention	to	the	requirements	of	the	context.	Measures	of	pro-environmental	attitudes	
and	behaviours,	nowadays	part	of	many	large-scale	surveys,	may	provide	the	information	

























Figure A1. Public goods game and coordination game and corresponding expected utility of cooperation and 
defection. a Two-player public goods game, with the discrete options cooperation, 𝐶, and defection, 𝐷. It must 
hold that 𝑏 > 𝑐, 𝑏 < 2𝑐. b Ego’s expected utility for 𝐶 and 𝐷 with 𝑏 =	1.99 and 𝑐 =	1 in the public goods game, 
assuming self-regarding preferences. 𝐸(𝐶) exceeds 𝐸(𝐷) independently of the probability of other choosing 𝐶. 
c Assuming social preferences, the nominal public goods game transforms into a coordination game (averages of 
disadvantageous inequity aversion, 𝛼, and advantageous inequity aversion, 𝛽, used for calculations as reported 
in Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). d This transformation takes places when ego’s subjective probability 𝑞 that other 
will cooperate exceeds the threshold 𝑞∗. This threshold derives from equating 𝐸(𝐶) with 𝐸(𝐷) and solving for 
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Figure 1. Effect of a behaviour intervention on pro-environmental behaviour, depending on the 
tension between the private and public benefit inherent to the underlying environmental dilemma. 
Low tension implies room for strong effects. High tension implies little room for strong effects. Effect 
sizes are taken from Bergquist et al., (2019) and Nisa et al., (2019). 
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Figure 2. Illustrative threshold density distributions (a-c), and the corresponding cumulative 
distributions (d-f). The shape of a given distribution depends on the tension between the private and 
public benefit inherent to the underlying environmental dilemma. a, d Low tension, right-skewed 



























































































Figure 3. Beliefs-based intervention. 500 thresholds, 𝑞1∗, and beliefs, 𝑞;1-, pre-intervention (𝑡 = 0) (a, 
d, g, j), after a first intervention (𝑡 = 1) (b, e, h, k) and  after a second intervention (𝑡 = 2) (c, f, I, l). 
The dashed vertical line denotes cooperation 𝑞 at time 𝑡. Region 𝐴: cooperators 𝑥5 with the accurate 





















































































































































































belief of 𝑞;1B < 𝑞1∗. 𝐷: defectors 𝑥A with the accurate belief of 𝑞;1B < 𝑞1∗. Post-intervention (𝑡 = 1), all 
individuals adapt their beliefs to match the descriptive feedback. Concerning behaviour, the individuals 
in 𝐴 keep cooperating, those in 𝐵 switch from cooperation to defection, those in 𝐶 start cooperating 
and those in 𝐷 keep defecting. The same logic applies to a second intervention at 𝑡 = 2, with post-
intervention cooperation 𝑞5 as the new baseline for decisions regarding cooperation. a-c Scenario 1: 
right-skewed distribution, 𝑞;1B and 𝑞1∗ uncorrelated. d-f. Scenario 2: symmetric distribution, 𝑞;1Band 𝑞1∗ 
positively correlated. g-i. Scenario 3: symmetric distribution, 𝑞;1B and 𝑞1∗ negatively correlated. j-l. 









Figure 4. Structure of preference heterogeneity, the potential for tipping, and suggested 
intervention strategy. The tension between private and public benefit underlying an environmental 
dilemma, the distribution of pro-social preferences in a population, the distribution of beliefs regarding 
cooperation (pre-intervention) and the cooperation level (pre-intervention) jointly shape the potential 
for tipping. Small interventions, centring on the mere provision of descriptive feedback may activate 
tipping if the potential is weak. Large interventions, combining different intervention strategies are 
necessary to activate tipping if the potential is strong. 
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